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Natika Newton in Foundations of Understanding has given us a powerful, in-
sightful and intriguing account of the experience of understanding. She offers
compelling arguments for a foundationalist and internalist theory of understanding
and intentionality, offering empirical evidence from the neurosciences to sup-
port her view. Although she is working within the analytic tradition, she sees a
kinship between her theory and the work of the continental phenomenologists.
This is so because she rejects the prevailing view among analytic philosophers
of mind that cognition is best explained in terms of a linguistic paradigm. She
contends that at the foundational level conscious understanding and conscious
intentionality are best explained in terms of bodily experience rather than in terms
of language or language-like structures. She joins a growing number of analytic
philosophers who focus, as the phenomenologists earlier in the century did, on
the embodied nature of consciousness. Her view is most closely related to that
of Merleau-Ponty because like him she sees bodily intentionality as the most
primary level of intentionality. But grounding cognition in action and grounding
language in the non-linguistic also unites her view with that of the later
Wittgenstein. Because of this dual kinship, Newton helps bridge the gap between
continental and analytic philosophy. Her work should be of interest to philoso-
phers from both traditions as well as those who believe a dialogue between the
two traditions is important for furthering our philosophical understanding.
Newton's theory is essentially a theory of our experience of conscious un-
derstanding. It is a foundationalist theory because she argues that all experi-
ences of understanding are derived from experiences of understanding our own
basic voluntary actions. It is an internalist theory because, on her view, the
conscious understanding of actions is constituted by something internal to the
subject: reactivated sensorimotor experiences. Newton's theory is also a ma-
terialist one because she offers an account of understanding intentionality in
terms of physical mechanisms: sensorimotor states.
The theory
Her plan for the book, she says in the introduction, is to analyze cases of con-
scious understanding and discover the mechanisms that make them possible.
She believes this analysis of understanding will shed light on the nature of con-
sciousness and intentionality as well. Because any intentional state is by na-
ture about something, its existence requires an understanding of the something
which the state is about. Hence an account of conscious understanding con-
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tributes to an account of conscious intentionality. Such an account contrib-
utes to an account of consciousness as well, since, if it is successful, it ex-
plains at least one type of conscious mental state.
The sensorimotor theory of cognition
Newton adheres to what she calls the sensorimotor theory of cognition, the
belief that all higher cognition relies on the same structures as those used in
sensorimotor activity. She combines this theory with her own version of a
mental models approach to cognition. Her idea is that cognition involves the
construction of analog models of reality and these models are constructed using
representations that are sensorimotor images. Thinking involves the manipu-
lation of these images not the manipulation of syntactic structures. To avoid
construing Newton's theory as a kind of disguised Humean empiricism where
thinking is the association of visual or quasi-visual pictures, the reader must
pay careful attention to her repeated warnings that she is speaking of images
in all sensory modalities not just the visual. In addition these images are not
something that exist in some private mental sphere but are “the reactivation
of past sensorimotor experiences of the subject” (p. 19). They are bodily
experiences. In chapter two she offers a great deal of fascinating empirical
evidence, behavioral, neuroscientific and evolutionary, to support her view
that cognitive abilities are rooted in motor abilities. The remainder of the book
offers an account of one primary cognitive activity: understanding and how
understanding is rooted in motor activity.
Understanding actions
For Newton all understanding is founded in the nonconceptual understand-
ing a person has of her own basic, goal-directed action. Such actions are
understood in themselves and rely on no more basic understanding. This is
so because the minimal condition for understanding a simple action is being
“able to imagine performing the action, with an image rich enough to serve
as a guide in the actual performance” of the action (p. 71). Such imagining
involves the reactivation of sensorimotor experiences, but it does not involve
the use of concepts or language which would themselves require further un-
derstanding. That is why, at its most primitive level, the understanding of
actions (more accurately, action types) is the foundation of all understand-
ing. Newton goes on in subsequent chapters to explain how the understand-
ing of objects rests on the understanding of actions and how the understanding
of the concept of a person rests on understanding of both objects and actions.
In one of the last chapters, she argues that the understanding of language rests
on all the subsequent forms of understanding. A hierarchy of types of un-
derstanding is developed with the foundation being the understanding of actions.
443BOOK REVIEWS
The value of the theory
Newton offers us a plausible science and phenomenology based theory of un-
derstanding which founds understanding in the body and its structures. These
are structures we share with human infants as well as with some nonhuman
animals. Hence she provides us with a theory which allows for the existence
of understanding in infants and other mammals and for a continuity between
those forms of understanding and more sophisticated forms of understand-
ing present in adult humans. In addition she offers us an alternative to the
computational accounts of cognition with their inherent dualism and disregard
for the body and its existence in the world. Because all forms of understand-
ing are explained in terms of one basic form of understanding, Newton's theory
has an inherent simplicity. In addition it avoids any threat of an infinite re-
gress because the foundational form of understanding requires no other un-
derstanding to understand it. Newton also appeals to a wide range of scientific
evidence which does not prove the theory is correct (and she never claims it
does), but it does add to its plausibility.
One might ask whether Newton's foundationalist theory of understanding
runs into the same kind of problems that haunt a Cartesian foundationalist epis-
temology which also finds the foundations in the inner world of the subject.
I think it is a strength of the theory that the answer is no. Newton manages to
give us an internalist account of understanding and intentionality which avoids
the solipsism and the irreparable split between the self and the world that
usually accompanies such theories. She does so by arguing that the imagery
which is constitutive of understanding is a bodily state, which is, in principle,
publicly accessible and by arguing that conscious experience arises from the
blending of internal and external input. Hence experience unites rather than
separates the self and the world.
A problem for the theory
Newton characterizes understanding as the reactivation of sensorimotor im-
agery. When one is conscious of the sensorimotor imagery, then one feels one
understands; one is aware of understanding. Newton acknowledges, however,
that it is possible for a person to understand something without the feeling of
understanding being experienced. But why does it often appear that she
conflates understanding and the feeling one understands? Why does she some-
times talk about her theory as a theory of understanding and at other times
as a theory of the experience of understanding? I think this is because although
one could understand without the conscious experience or feeling of under-
standing, the feeling when present is created by the consciousness of what
Newton contends constitutes understanding – sensorimotor imagery. An analy-
sis of the experience of understanding will, of course, include an analysis of
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the imagery which creates this feeling. It follows that given these characteriza-
tions of understanding and of the experience of understanding, an analysis of
the experience will provide an analysis of understanding itself, whether the
understanding is conscious or not. This is so because such an analysis will in-
clude a discussion of the sensorimotor imagery which, on her view, constitutes
understanding. But Newton's analysis of the experience of understanding only
works as an analysis of understanding itself if one accepts her contention that
the feeling that one understands is always accompanied by the understanding
of some sort even if such understanding is, to use her word, incorrect. But I
think her assertion that she is not using the term understanding in a normative
sense and so there can be understanding which is misunderstanding is misguided.
It is part of the very meaning of the term that it is normative.
Incorrect understanding is not understanding of the wrong sort; it is not un-
derstanding at all. Her account of the feeling of understanding and its source
in sensorimotor imagery is powerful and insightful and does indeed help to
illuminate the nature of intentionality and consciousness. But her theory fails
to capture the distinction between understanding and misunderstanding. What
distinguishes a case where I feel I understand and I do not from one in which
I feel I understand and I actually do? An account of the experience of under-
standing (thinking one understands) won't answer this question since the feeling
is present in both cases. The presence or absence of sensorimotor imagery
won't either since that is present in both cases according to Newton. The only
way to capture the distinction between understanding and misunderstanding
is to modify Newton's notion of what constitutes understanding. She contends
that understanding is the reactivation of sensorimotor imagery. I would argue
only the reactivation of the correct sensorimotor imagery constitutes under-
standing. If you accept her characterization of understanding, then you will
believe, as she does, that cases of misunderstanding are, in some sense, cases
of understanding, since sensorimotor imagery is present. But if the definition
of understanding is modified in the way I suggest, then there is no need to
deny the inherently normative nature of understanding. On the modified ver-
sion of her theory understanding is still constituted by a bodily state, so an
internalist theory of understanding is still possible if this modified version is
correct. But knowing that one understands requires appeal to an objective
world. This fits well with the explanation of error Newton offers in chapter
five. This modified version explains how it is possible for one to understand
without realizing one does. One does not, as Newton suggests, become aware
that one understands simply by becoming conscious of the sensorimotor im-
agery. To be certain one understands one must establish that the imagery that
has been reactivated matches the input from the external world and hence the
external world itself.
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Newton herself raises more obvious problems with the theory. One such
problem is how a theory which equates understanding with imagery can ac-
count for our understanding of abstract ideas. Another is that if imagery con-
stitutes understanding, why do some people claim that although they are
conscious of understanding, they are not conscious, even upon reflection, of
the presence of the imagery she contends constitutes understanding. In her
book, Newton offers convincing solutions to these problems.
In sum. Foundations of Understanding is an exciting exploration of human
cognition. It takes the insights of earlier philosophers from both the analytic
and continental traditions and extends and grounds them by appeal to current
scientific findings. It does so without ever forgetting the bodily nature of the
subject who understands.
University of Michigan-Dearborn Kathleen Wider
Calvin O. Schrag, The Self After Postmodernity. (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1997). Xiv + 155 pp.
This volume presents the revised text of the Gilbert Ryle Lectures given by
the author at Trent University, Ontario, in 1995. It is commendable that the
sponsors of the Ryle lectures have not limited themselves to philosophers of
the analytic tradition, in which Ryle played such an important role, choosing
on this occasion a distinguished representative of the Continental tradition.
But we are living in a time when that distinction has in any case become out-
moded, and as we look back, as Calvin Schrag points out here (pp. xif), we
may be able to see Ryle in a different light. It is well known that in his early
years he reviewed Heidegger for Mind, giving the German philosopher a re-
spectful if not uncritical reading. He reviewed other phenomenological writ-
ers as well. More importantly, his attack on the mind-body split may be read,
together with the work of Merleau-Ponty and others, as part of a common
20th century effort to get beyond this aspect of the Cartesian legacy.
As if in recognition that the analytic-continental divide is no longer a burn-
ing issue, Schrag, ever a conciliatory thinker, has little to say about it. Though
he mentions Ryle a few times, his reconciling attentions are directed to an-
other and more recent rift, this one within the tradition of continental philoso-
phy itself. Continuing the project he began in his Communicative Praxis and
the Space of Subjectivity (1986) and continued in The Resources of Ration-
ality: A Response to the Postmodern Challenge (1992, both Indiana Univer-
sity Press), Schrag is concerned here with the post-modem turn in recent
